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INTRODUCTION

For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today,
the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind
blows.
-Justice Harry Blackmun*
Women in much of the world lack support for fundamental functions
of a human life ....

[O]bstacles often impede their effective partici-

pation in political life. In many nations women are not full equals
under the law .

. .

. In all these ways, unequal social and political

circumstances give women unequal human capabilities.
-Martha Nussbaumt
In April of 2007, the United States Supreme Court reminded the
nation that "[a]bortion continues to be a highly contentious issue in the
United States, with few signs of abatement."' In a decision that
"promises to reframe the abortion debate," 2 Gonzales v. Carhart
3
"upheld as constitutional the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531."1 This decision is the latest in
evolving Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence that began with the
"landmark 1973 ruling ' 5 of Roe v. Wade,6 which gave women the right
to have an abortion.7 In upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 against a facial attack for unconstitutionality, 8 the majority opinion
by Justice Kennedy concluded that the Act is "not void for vagueness,
does not impose an undue burden from any overbreadth, and is not invalid on its face." 9
* Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
t MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 (2000).
1. John P. Hoffmann & Sherrie Mills Johnson, Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Religious
Traditions in the United States: Change or Continuity?, 66 Soc. RELIGION 161, 161 (2005).
2. Linda Greenhouse, In Reversal of Course, Justices, 5-4, Back Ban on Abortion Method,

N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at Al.
3. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
4. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 331 (6th Cir. 2007).
5. Sara Lipka, After Roe, ATLANTIC ONLINE, May 2, 2006, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/
print/200605u/abortion-interview.

6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Jeanette M. Soares, Abortion, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1099, 1099 (2006).
8. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.
9. Id. at 1627.
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This note argues that, in spite of its relatively narrow and seemingly
°
innocuous holding, Gonzales v. Carhart(also referred to as CarhartH )
2
is ultimately an "alarming"'' "setback to a woman's right to choose"'

that gave "anti-choice activists 'the long-awaited victory they expected
from a more conservative bench"', 3 and "will inflame political controversy rather than diminish it."' 4 Part II discusses the extensive precedent

upon which the decision is founded, including both abortion jurisprudence and Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as well as the legislative
history of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. Part III introduces
the cases that gave rise to Gonzales v. Carhart and deconstructs the

decision itself, including the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, the
concurrence by Justice Thomas, and the dissent by Justice Ginsburg.
Part III also offers a critique of the decision, and ultimately argues that
the majority opinion "abandons core principles"' 5 of and represents "a
17
sharp reversal from" 6 fundamental abortion jurisprudence. Part III
will also address the possible ramifications of the Act in the medical
profession,' 8 the abandonment "of the Casey/Carhartundue burden test
for facial challenges,"' 9 the troubling and paternalistic language of Jus10. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Comment, Expanding Congressional Power in Gonzales v.
Carhart, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 165, 165 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2007/07/23/weinsteintull.pdf. This designation as "Carhart Ir' is to distinguish Gonzales v.
Carhart from the Supreme Court case of Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S. 914 (2000), known as
CarhartI. See Weinstein-Tull, supra, at 165.
11. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 10, at 165.
13. Posting of Jill Filipovic to Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (Apr. 19,
2007, 21:43 EST).
14. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 432 (2007).
15. Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp (Apr. 18, 2007,
18:17 EST).
16. Id.
17. Id. Bonnie Scott Jones, a senior attorney at the Center for Reproductive Rights, stated that
the holding of the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart "abandons core principles of Roe v.
Wade and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey," id., both of which are among the most important cases
in abortion jurisprudence.
18. It has been predicted by a number of professionals that the ruling in Gonzales v. Carhart,
while supposedly confined to banning intact dilation and extraction (also called "dilation &
extraction") abortion procedures, will have a "chilling effect" on the few doctors who actually
perform abortions after twelve weeks. See, e.g., Bruce Kessler, Abortion: Supreme Court Upholds
Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act Against Facial Challenge-Gonzales v. Carhart, 33 Am. J.L. &
MED. 523, 526 (2007); Supreme Court Upholds FederalAbortion Ban, Opens Door for Further
Restrictions by States, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., Spring 2007, at 19, 19; Lynn Harris, Supreme
Court Upholds Ban on "Partial-Birth"Abortion, SALON, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.salon.com
mwt/feature/2007/04/19/scotus.banprint.html; Posting of Jill Filipovic to Huffington Post, supra
note 13.
19. Posting of Marty Lederman to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp (Apr. 18,
2007, 10:43 EST).
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tice Kennedy,"° the implications of Justice Kennedy's references to "ethical and moral concerns, '"21 and the unprecedented absence of a health
exception in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. 2 Lastly, Part III will
explore the possible arguments and outcome of challenging the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act under the Commerce Clause. Part IV will then
examine the direction various courts appear to be taking since Gonzales
v. Carhart was decided in April in relation to "partial-birth" abortion
bans in an effort to determine the direction of future abortion
jurisprudence.
II.

THE DISTINCT HISTORIES OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
RIGHT

A.

To

CHOOSE

A Brief History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
1.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

While the text of the Commerce Clause may be "facially clearcut,"" the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court "has been surprisingly inconsistent over the last ten
years."2 4 After a period of time from 1937 to 1995, during which "not
one statute was struck down on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's
Commerce power,"25 the "Supreme Court handed down two . . . decisions intended to restore the balance between congressional Commerce
Clause legislation and state police power regulations."2 6 These two decisions, United States v. Lopez2 7 and United States v. Morrison, 8 have
been said to signal "a federalist revolution in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in which the Court seemed to be drawing lines around the types
20. There have been numerous observations and criticisms of Justice Kennedy's use of
paternalistic language in the majority opinion of Gonzales v. Carhart. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at
AI8; Anita L. Allen, Atmospherics: Abortion Law and Philosophy (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.
Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 180, 2007), available at http:/Ilsr.nellco.org/upennlwps/
papers/180; Dahlia Lithwick, Father Knows Best: Dr. Kennedy's Magic Prescription for
Indecisive Women, SLATE, Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2164512; Posting of Jack
Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Apr. 19, 2007, 14:50 EST).
21. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
22. Supreme Court Upholds FederalAbortion Ban, Opens Door for FurtherRestrictions by
States, supra note 18, at 19.
23. David L. Luck, Note, Guns, Drugs, and ... Federalism?-Gonzalesv. Raich Enfeebles
the Rehnquist Court's Lopez-Morrison Framework, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 252 (2006).
24. Jordan Goldberg, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why
ProgressivesMight Be Tempted To Embrace Federalism,75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 302 (2006).
25. Id.
26. Luck, supra note 23, at 238.
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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of areas that Congress can regulate."' 29 This seeming revolution, however, "appears to have been short-lived,' 3° based on the apparent divergence from that jurisprudence in Gonzales v. Raich,3' which has been
argued "to mark a move back toward ...a heavy emphasis on deference
of
to congressional judgment, paired with an expansive understanding
32
the Commerce power and the national market economy."
The basic paradigm under which we understand the Commerce
powers of Congress is that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers," 3 named in Article I, Section 8. The Commerce Clause delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."' 34 This power may be also combined with the Necessary and
Proper Clause.3 5
When discussing Commerce Clause jurisprudence, scholarship has
divided the decisions of the Supreme Court into "distinct chronologicalthematic eras."' 36 The nature of Congress's power to regulate Commerce
was first defined by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824
as "describ[ing] the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts
of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. ' 37 The Court continued by saying that the
commerce power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule
by which commerce is to be governed. '38 Even with this broad definition, however, the Court recognized inherent limitations of the Commerce power, including restricting "the word 'among' . . . to "that
29. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 302.
30. Id.
31. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
32. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 302.
33. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
35. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). The Necessary and Proper Clause states that
Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.18.
36. Luck, supra note 23, at 238. Those eras are recognized as: "(1) Broad Commerce Power,
but Largely Undefined-Inception-1888; (2) Narrowly Defined to Promote Laissez-Faire
Capitalism-1888-1936; (3) Broadly Defined to Further the New Deal-1937-1995." Id.
(emphasis omitted) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
163-225 (7th ed. 2004)). At times, a fourth era is also recognized: "(4) Broadly Defined, but
Somewhat Circumscribed to Foster Dual Federafism-1995-present." Id. (emphasis omitted).
37. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
38. Id. at 196.
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commerce which concerns more States than one." '39
Following the Supreme Court decision in Gibbons, and indeed for
the first century of our history, the Court dealt with cases in which the
Commerce Clause served as a limitation on the power of state legislation
that may or may not have impeded or discriminated against interstate
commerce or that once had been permissible.4" The nature of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence changed with the advent of "rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy,"4 1 during
which Congress "ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the
commerce power."42 In 1935, the Supreme Court drew a "distinction
between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon inter44
state commerce" 43 in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.
Two years later, in 1937, the new era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence began,45 and the Supreme Court "departed from the distinction
between 'direct' and 'indirect' effects" in the "watershed"4 6 case of
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.4 7 In
upholding the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause
challenge, "[tjhe Court held that intrastate activities that 'have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions' are within Congress' power to regulate."4 8 After Jones, it
had become "clear that broad commerce power proponents had prevailed, '4 9 a trend that would continue with the Supreme Court's next
major Commerce Clause decision.
In that decision, Wickard v. Filburn,5 ° the Court explicitly rejected
39. Id. at 194.
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one.... [A]nd the enumeration of the
particular classes of commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not
have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every description.
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a State.
Id. at 194-95.
40. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
553-54 (1995).
41. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16.
42. Id.
43. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Luck, supra note 23, at 251.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37).
Luck, supra note 23, at 255.

50. 317 U.S. 11I (1942).
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the earlier-made "distinctions between direct and indirect effects on
interstate commerce"5 1 and established the Aggregation Principle.52
Wickard has been called "the broadest Commerce Clause case to date"5 3
and "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity."' 54 In Wickard, a wheat farmer named
Filburn sought to enjoin enforcement of certain amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193815 that "were designed to control the
volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to
avoid surpluses and consequent abnormally low prices. '"56 Filbum
argued that his wheat could not be governed by regulations promulgated
under the Commerce Clause because it was "not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm." 57 In spite of this
argument, the Court upheld the applications of the amendments, stating
that,
[e]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect." 58
Thus, Wickard "establishe[d] that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for
sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would
59
undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.
Ultimately, it has been stated that Jones, Darby, and Wickard "ushered
in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the
previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause."6 0
2.

LOPEZ, MORRISON, AND RAICH:

THE CONTEMPORARY COMMERCE CLAUSE

The trend toward expansion of congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause was brought to a rather abrupt halt in 1995. In United
States v. Lopez, a twelfth-grade student in Texas was arrested and
charged with possession of a firearm on school premises.6" The day after
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
52. Luck, supra note 23, at 255.

53. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
317 U.S. at 113.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 125.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
Id. at 551.
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his arrest, federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990,62 in which Congress prohibited "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. '"63
In examining the history of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Court "identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power. "64
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulat[e] and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce ... 65
Within this final category of activity, the Court also concluded "that the
proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce" 66 in order to be within Congress's power to regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause.
The Court continued with its analysis of the Gun-Free School Zone
Act, concluding that if § 922(q) was to be sustained, it would have to be
under the third category of activities Congress could regulate: "an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. '67 The majority opinion then goes forth to list criteria to assess the impact on interstate
commerce:
(i) [W]hether the regulated activity was economic or non-economic;
(ii) whether there was a jurisdictional element tying the regulated
activity to interstate commerce so as to permit a case-by-case inquiry
when the connection to interstate commerce was not apparent; (iii)
whether the statute was accompanied by congressional findings
describing the connection of the regulated activity to interstate commerce; (iv) whether the regulation was part of a nationwide regulatory scheme whose efficacy would be undermined if Congress could
not reach the activity; and (v) whether accepting arguments regarding
the connection of interstate activity would mean, as a practical mat62. Id. The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. The Gun-Free School
Zone Act further defines "school zone" as "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private

school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private
school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(A)-(B) (2000).
64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
65. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 559.
67. Id.
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ter, that the commerce power had no enforceable limit.68

Using those criteria to evaluate the Gun-Free School Zone Act, the
Court concluded that "[t]he Act neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be connected in any
way to interstate commerce. '"69 In spite of Justice Souter's arguments
that the "commerce power ... is plenary"7 ° and that, "when faced with
two plausible interpretations of a federal criminal statute, [the Court]
generally will take the alternative that does not force [it] to impute an
intention to Congress to use its full commerce power to regulate conduct
traditionally and ably regulated by the States,"7 the majority opinion
held "that the Act exceed[ed] the authority of Congress" under the Commerce Clause.7"
...

The dissenters, "shocked by what they perceived as a return to the
distinction between direct and indirect effects and the Court's aban-

donment of its prior commitment to reviewing Commerce Clause legislation from a 'rational basis' perspective, ' 73 argued that the statute fell
"well within the scope of the commerce power as [the] Court has understood that power over the last half century.

'74

The dissent further stated

that "[u]pholding this legislation would do no more than simply recognize that Congress had a 'rational basis' for finding a significant connection between guns in or near schools and (through their effect on
68. Brannon P. Denning, Gonzales v. Carhart: An Alternate Opinion, 2006-2007 CATO SUp.
REV. 167, 172.
69. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "first
withheld application of the Aggregation Principle and noted the absence of a jurisdictional
element linking the firearm in issue to interstate commerce." Luck supra note 23, at 258. The
Chief Justice also noted that § 922(q) "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise"; nor was it "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity." Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561. Second, the majority opinion reiterated that "§ 922(q) contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce." Id. Lastly, the Chief Justice noted the absence of "congressional
findings regarding the effects ... of gun possession in school zones" on interstate commerce, id.
at 562, and ultimately stated that the Court was unwilling to "pile inference upon inference" in
order to connect the regulated activity with interstate commerce, id. at 567.
70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 610.
72. Id. at 551 (majority opinion).
73. Luck, supra note 23, at 259 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-17
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.) ("Courts must give Congress a
degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce-both because the Constitution delegates the
commerce power directly to Congress and because the determination requires an empirical
judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy. The
traditional words 'rationalbasis' capture this leeway. Thus, the specific question before us, as the
Court recognizes, is not whether the 'regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,'
but rather, whether Congress could have had 'a rational basis' for so concluding." (first emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
. 74. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.).
CT.
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education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threaten."7 5 Ulti"permit 'Congress . . . to act in
mately, the dissent argued, this would
76
terms of economic ... realities.' ,
The Court "reaffirmed [its] commitment to Lopez in Morrison."77
United States v. Morrison considered the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981,
which "provide[d] a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. '78 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "held that the VAWA exceeded the Commerce
Clause's scope, and in doing so clarified the Lopez framework. '79 The
framework outlined in Lopez and Morrison follows:
(1) [D]oes the case involve "substantial effects" legislation; (2) if so,
is the regulatory subject matter commercial or non-commercial; (3) is
there a jurisdictional element ensuring a connection to interstate commerce; (4) are there congressional findings demonstrating a connection to interstate commerce; and (5) is the purported effect on
interstate commerce attenuated-is it predicated upon an inference
upon an inference?8"
The Court, in spite of the "mountain of data" 8 1 compiled by Congress tending to show "the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families" 8 2 and "the interstate commercial
effects of gender-motivated crimes of violence," 8 3 concluded that "the
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain
the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. 84 In striking
down the statute as unconstitutional, "[t]he Court clarified that the economic or non-economic nature of the regulated activity was 'central to
[its] decision in' Lopez ' 85 and also noted the "importance of the jurisdictional element." 86
The dissent made it clear that they viewed the decision as a marked
divergence from traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence, remarking
that § 13981 "would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in
1942 and Lopez in 1995."87 That time, the dissent stated, was "a period
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 631.
Id. (alterations in original).
Luck, supra note 23, at 259.
529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
Luck, supra note 23, at 259.
Id. at 259-60.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 614 (majority opinion).
Id. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 614 (majority opinion).
Denning, supra note 68, at 173 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610).
Id. (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding that congressional
power under the Commerce Clause . . . extended to all activity that,
when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. "88
Thus, the Supreme Court appeared to have embraced a more
restrictive view of the Commerce Clause power of Congress in both
Lopez and Morrison. Perhaps, because these two cases appeared to have
such striking precedential value8 9 in that they were "intended to provide
an ongoing analytical framework"90 for legislation generated under the
Commerce Clause, the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich9 1 has been
said to encircle the "Lopez-Morrison framework in a cloud of
uncertainty." 92
Gonzales v. Raich involved a challenge to the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801, in a case that arose over the use
of medical marijuana. 93 California became the "first State to authorize
limited use of [marijuana] for medicinal purposes" 94 when it enacted the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996.95 The Act "was designed to ensure that
'seriously ill' residents of the State have access to marijuana for medical
purposes." 96 The Act created "an exemption from criminal prosecution
for" doctors, patients, and primary caregivers "who possess or cultivate
marijuana for medicinal purposes with the recommendation or approval
of a physician."9' 7
Although noting that the respondents' challenge to the CSA was
"quite limited," 9 8 the Supreme Court held that the "CSA [was] a valid
exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this
88. Id.
89. Luck, supra note 23, at 280.

90. Id.
91. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
92. Luck, supra note 23, at 279.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7.
Id. at 5.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 5-6.

97. Id. at 6.
98. Id. at 15. Indeed, Justice Stevens attempts to distinguish Lopez and Morrison from
Gonzales v. Raich by emphasizing that in Raich "respondents ask us to excise individual
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme." Id. at 23. Justice Stevens states,
[T]he statutory challenges at issue in those cases were markedly different from the
challenge respondents pursue in the case at hand. Here, respondents ask us to excise
individual applications of a concededly valid scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and
Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside
Congress' commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for we have
often reiterated that "[wihere the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial,
individual instances' of the class."
Id. (second alteration in original).
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case." 99 The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, posited that
the "Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers' response to the central
problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal
commerce power under the Articles of Confederation." °° The Court
emphasized that "case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"' 0 ' and, no
matter the nature of the activity, "it may still ... be reached by Congress
'0 2
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."'
Reviewing its Commerce Clause jurisprudence and likening the instant
case to Wickard v. Filburn, the Court ultimately concluded that in both
cases, "the regulation [was] squarely within Congress' commerce power
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be
it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in
the national market for that commodity."'0 3
Addressing contentions that the instant case did not appear to follow the recent cases of Lopez and Morrison, the majority opinion proceeded to distinguish those cases from the situation in Gonzales v.
Raich. The Court called the respondents' reliance on those two cases
"myopic" because the respondents "overlook[ed] the larger context of
modem-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those
cases."' The Court distinguished Lopez by saying that that "Act did not
regulate any economic activity and did not contain any requirement that
the possession of a gun have any connection to past interstate activity or
a predictable impact on future commercial activity"'01 5 and said that the
statutory scheme at issue in Raich was "at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum."'0 6 Likewise, the Court distinguished Morrison by stating that the statute in that case was unconstitutional because it did not
regulate economic activity and was essentially a criminal statute.'0 7
Thus, the Court appeared to distinguish Raich from Lopez and Morrison through a number of small nuances.'0 8 Justice Stevens' majority in
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 17.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 25.
108. For example, Justice Stevens attempts to distinguish Raich from Lopez and Morrison by
arguing that Raich and Monson, the respondents, brought limited, as-applied challenges to a
statutory scheme and that the Court lacked the authority to strike these "individual applications of
a concededly valid statutory scheme." Id. at 23; see also Luck, supra note 23, at 280-81
(discussing respondents' challenge to the statute). Additionally, as previously mentioned, the
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Raich openly likened the case to that of Wickard v. Filburn, which was

called "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity."' 9 Ultimately, it has been argued that
the decision in Gonzales v. Raich was a somewhat striking divergence
from Lopez and Morrison and that the "resulting conception of the
110
Lopez-Morrison framework is... 'little more than a drafting guide."'
At the least, "Raich appears to mark a move back toward the post-New
Deal method of interpreting the Commerce Clause, with a heavy empha-

sis on deference to congressional judgment, paired with an expansive
understanding of the Commerce power and the national market
economy." 11
3.

THE INTERSECTION OF ABORTION REGULATION AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE

In the past, Congress has used the Commerce Clause to legislate in
"areas that appear to be only tenuously connected with interstate commerce, such as racial discrimination, environmental protection, and violence against women."'1 2 While Congress never directly regulated
abortion before the decision of Roe v. Wade in 1973,'1 Congress has
recently begun to regulate abortion under its Commerce Clause powers.
In determining whether abortion can be regulated by Congress
under the Commerce Clause, there are many unsettled questions. Abortion could potentially be regulated in a number of different ways, and
"[t]he constitutionality of federal laws regulating abortion may depend
upon whether Congress attempts to regulate the procedures for providing abortions, access to abortion services, or the type of person who is
able to provide or receive abortions,"1 1 4 as well as by whether a court
employs a Lopez/Morrison or Raich methodology. 5 Abortion would
majority opinion distinguishes Lopez and Morrison by arguing that the statutes involved in those
cases were criminal statutes that had nothing to do with commerce. See supra text accompanying
note 107.
109. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). The Court's reliance on Wickard is also
notable because in that case, the farmer was a commercial farmer, which enabled Chief Justice
Rehnquist to state that, "in every case where we have sustained federal regulation under the
aggregation principle in Wickard v. Filburn, the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial
character." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000) (citation omitted). In Raich,
in direct comparison, the two women were sick patients using medical marijuana for their own
ailments, who did not participate in the commercial market for marijuana. See Raich, 545 U.S. at
6-7.
110. Luck, supra note 23, at 283.
111. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 302.
112. Id. at 322.
113. Id. at 323.
114. Id. at 326.
115. Id. at 328.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:339

appear to fall within the categories mentioned in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez and in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Raich because "it
has traditionally been regulated by the states, not by the federal govern-

and because it
ment, both because it is a part of the practice of medicine
'' 16
is a social issue often thought best left to the states."
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)" 7
provides a useful example of Congress passing an abortion-related statute after Raich. FACE is legislation designed to facilitate access to

reproductive-health-clinic entrances without undue interference or intimidation. "8 The purpose of FACE was "to protect and promote the public

safety and health and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent,
threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct that is intended to
injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide
reproductive health services. I" "FACE regulated the actions of protestors outside abortion clinics and reproductive health facilities, and was
intended to protect clinics that the states were unable or unwilling to
protect."' 2 ° FACE has repeatedly been challenged and upheld,' and
thus can be argued to provide a useful example for how courts uphold
legislation after Raich that is related to abortion 2 : "As of 2005, eight
circuit courts have upheld FACE on the grounds that abortion services
substantially affect interstate commerce and therefore that obstructing
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000)).
118. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 248 states,
(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.-Whoever(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of
religious freedom at a place of religious worship; or
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to
do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally
damages or destroys the property of a place of religious worship, shall be subject to
0
the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in
subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be subject
to any penalties or civil remedies under this section for such activities insofar as
they are directed exclusively at that minor.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
119. § 2, 108 Stat. at 694.
120. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 324.
121. Id. at 333.
122. E.g., id. at 332.
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the entrance to a clinic is an obstruction of commerce that can be
reached under the Commerce power. "123
FACE has been challenged "under circumstances in which protestors were accused of physically obstructing abortion services facilities."' 124 Even before Lopez was decided in 1995, the Fourth Circuit in
American Life League, Inc. v. Reno stated that "[a] federal statute is
valid under the Commerce Clause if Congress (1) rationally concluded
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce and (2) chose a
regulatory means reasonably adapted to a permissible end."'' 25 Because
"violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions aimed at persons
seeking or providing reproductive health services affect interstate commerce,"' 26 the Court held that FACE was "within the commerce power
127
of Congress."'
"Even after Lopez and Morrison, every circuit [court] to address
FACE has upheld it.' 2 8 The courts to uphold FACE have emphasized
"that their role is to 'decide whether a rational basis exists for concluding that [the] regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce,' "129 and have concluded that such a basis does indeed exist.
After Lopez and Morrison struck down statutes because the activity
being regulated was "non-economic," the courts have upheld FACE by
reasoning that although the activity being regulated-protesting outside
of reproductive-health-care facilities-is not economic per se, "the fact
that the activity was aimed at preventing or threatening commerce made
the statute sufficiently related to 'economic activity' to fall within Congress's power." 3 ' Thus, the courts that have upheld FACE against Commerce Clause challenges have generally used a Raich-like analysis of
giving deference to Congress's rational basis for enacting legislation.
123. Id. at 333; see also United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633, 634 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[Tlhis Court
held that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) is a valid exercise of Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause."); Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 559 (6th Cir. 2002)
(upholding FACE under a challenge to Congress's Commerce Clause power); United States v.
Grcgg, 226 F.3d 253, 26l-67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); United States v, Weslin, 156 F.3d 292.
295-96 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 672-82 (5th Cir.
1997) (same); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 582-88 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Terry v. Reno, 101
F.3d 1412, 1415-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413,
1415-16 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-21 (8th Cir.
1996) (same); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 679-88 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
124. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 333.
125. 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 645.
128. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 333.
129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir.
1995)).
130. Id. at 334.
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Ultimately, the "question of whether an abortion procedure itself is
commerce has yet to be entirely settled," 13 1 and the Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue. In light of Raich, however, which held that
"Congress need have only a rational basis for believing that an activity
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and not[ed] that in cases
where the activity is 'economic,' no particularized findings are
necessary,"1'32
[i]f abortion or abortion services are to be regulated under the Commerce Clause, they would have to be understood to fit within one of
the last two [Lopez] categories, as commerce that can be regulated
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities or as
activities that can be regulated even though they are not themselves
because they have a substantial relation to interinterstate commerce
33
state commerce.1
B.
1.

The Birth of the Right To Choose

GRISWOLD, AND THE PENUMBRAS

OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

One of the oldest fundamental rights recognized by the law is the
right to bodily integrity.' 34 This notion of bodily integrity is "most commonly associated with the Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due
process, under which it is closely tied to the concept of personal autonomy."'1 35 The "autonomy" cases are "epitomized by the Supreme Court's
reproductive-rights jurisprudence."' 136 While the autonomy cases
originally viewed the right at stake as having as much to do with
protecting one's health and making medical treatment choices in consultation with a physician as with more abstract autonomy rights[,]
...[iun their present incarnation, the autonomy cases have come to
stand for constitutional protection of certain dignity and equality
interests.137
The right to choose an abortion, which was established in Roe v. Wade
in 1973,18 was grounded "in the right to privacy found in the penum131. Id. at 328.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
134. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 125, * 127,
* 130), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 816-18 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (detailing Supreme Court
decisions dating back to 1884 regarding the right to be free from bodily intrusions).
135. B. Jessie Hill, The ConstitutionalRight To Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of
Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. Rv. 277, 305 (2007) (footnote omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 305-06.
138. Soares, supra note 7, at 1099.
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bras of the Bill of Rights as first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut
and Eisenstadt v. Baird."'39 This "right to have an abortion . . .has
become an established and accepted legal principle"' 4 0 in the thirty-five
years since Roe v. Wade was decided.
One important case in the line of "autonomy" cases141 is Griswold
v. Connecticut."'2 Griswold concerned a challenge to a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and prohibiting any other individual from helping another to obtain contraceptives." 43 The Court
began by reviewing a line of cases implicating the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4" The Court then concluded that the
cases discussed "suggest[ed] that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance.""' 5 In striking down the Connecticut statute, the Court stated that "[t]he present case . . .concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"1 4 6 : a "right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights.""' 7 For the Court, "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights ...[are] formed by emanations from [the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights] that help give them life and substance.""' 8
Justice Goldberg's concurrence also reinforced the notion that there
are fundamental rights not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
The right of privacy, contended Justice Goldberg, "is a fundamental personal right, emanating 'from the totality of the constitutional scheme
under which we live.""' 9 The concurrence noted that the Supreme
Court had "never held that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights that the Constitution specifically men139. Id. at 1102 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 1099.
141. See Hill, supra note 135, at 306-07 (discussing Griswold and describing the case as the
"first autonomy case dealing with a right to make medical treatment choices").
142. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
143. 1i elvevant part, the statutcs challenged in Griswold stated, "Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not
less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both
fined and imprisoned." Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)). Additionally,
section 54-196 of the statute provided that "[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires, or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were
the principal offender." Id.
144. Id. at 481-82.
145. Id. at 484.
146. Id. at 485.
147. Id. at 486.
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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tions ' " 5 ° and asserted that "the Framers did not intend that the first eight
amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights
which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."' 5' Indeed, the very
existence of the Ninth Amendment
shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights
exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments
and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive. The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the
Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should
not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are
not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional
52
amendments.'
For those reasons, Justice Goldberg concluded that
[t]o hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in
our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed
because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first
eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.15 3
Responding to concerns that protecting unenumerated rights as fundamental may be difficult and might vest judges with "unrestricted personal discretion,"' 5 4 Justice Goldberg also supplied useful criteria for
identifying fundamental rights: Judges
must look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] ...as to be
ranked as fundamental." The inquiry is whether a right involved "is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions.' ,155
2.

ROE V. WADE: THE HALLMARK OF ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

The next major Supreme Court decision relating to privacy rights,
and more specifically to abortion rights, was Roe v. Wade 56 in 1973. It
can be stated with confidence that "Roe v. Wade is one of the most
significant Supreme Court decisions in our nation's history."' 15 7 Indeed,
it has been argued that "[flew decisions have had a greater effect on
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

486 n.1.
490.
492.
491.

154. Id. at 494 n.7.
155. Id. at 493 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

157. Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists,
62 ALB. L. REv. 853, 939 (1999).

2008]

THE PARTIAL TERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE

357

legal doctrine, on legal process, and on legal culture than Roe,"' 58 and
that the case "is one of the most important, if not the single most significant, defining events in the socio-cultural life of the current generation
of Americans." '5 9 In his majority opinion, "Justice Blackmun did not
turn to any protection for bodily integrity, but rather staked his opinion
on"'160 the right to privacy stemming from the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights and from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that
were found in Griswold and earlier cases 1 ' to hold that "the right to
personal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution included a 'woman's
162
right to determine whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
Roe v. Wade involved a challenge to Texas statutes, 16 3 first enacted
in 1854,'64 that made "it a crime to 'procure an abortion,' as therein
defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to 'an abortion procured
or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.' "165 Jane Roe, 166 an unmarried and pregnant woman living in
Texas, instituted a federal action in March of 1970 alleging that she
wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a "physician, under safe, clinical conditions."' 167 Roe claimed that the Texas
statutes prohibiting her from procuring an abortion were "unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments." '68 After concluding that Jane Roe had standing as a sin169
gle pregnant woman "thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws"'
and that the case was not moot, 70 the majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, 17 proceeded to the merits of the case.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 940.
160. Seth F. Kreimer, Rejecting "Uncontrolled Authority over the Body": The Decencies of
Civilized Conduct, the Past, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423,
431 (2007) (footnote omitted).
161. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 ("Appellant would discover this right [to terminate her
pregnancy] in the concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill
of Rights or its penumbras .... " (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))).
162. Soares, supra note 7, at 1099-1100.
163. The Texas statutes involved were articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code.
164. Roe, 410 U.S. at 119. After the first statutes criminalizing abortion were enacted in Texas
in 1854, the statutes were modified soon after and then remained essentially the same until this
challenge was brought in 1970. Id. at 119-20.
165. Id. at 117-18.

166. This name was a pseudonym. Id. at 120 n.4.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

120.
124.
125.
116.
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Justice Blackmun began by reviewing the history of abortion legislation and restrictions, dating back even to the Greek and Roman
empires.72 From this examination, the majority opinion concluded that,
"at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and
throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed
with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in
effect," 17 3 and that a woman "enjoyed a substantially broader right to
terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today." '7 4 Additionally, the Court reviewed the three reasons that had traditionally been
advanced to explain "the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th
century and to justify their continued existence"' 75 : (1) a "social concern
to discourage illicit sexual conduct,"' 7 6 (2) concerns with abortion being
hazardous as a medical procedure, 77 and (3) the State's interest in "pro' 78
tecting prenatal life."'
The Court then proceeded with its discussion of the right of privacy, in which the right to terminate a pregnancy was ultimately found.
Acknowledging that "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy, "179 Justice Blackmun stated that, nonetheless, "the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution"18 0 in
a line of decisions arguably dating back to 1891.181 This right of privacy
was recognized by the Court to have roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments as well as in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and
182
in the "concept of liberty guaranteed" by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most importantly, the Court concluded that
[tihis right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
172. See id. at 129-41.
173. Id. at 140.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 147.
176. Id. at 148.
177. See id. at 148-49. The Court concluded that "any interest of the State in protecting the
woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for
her to forgo it, has largely disappeared," id. at 149, but that "[tihe State has a legitimate interest in
seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient," id. at 150.
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id. at 152.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."').
182. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
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action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
enough to encompass
83
1
pregnancy.
her
Taking into consideration the aforementioned interests purported to
justify the criminal abortion statutes, however, the Court determined
that, while "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,"' 84 "[t]he privacy right involved . .. cannot be said to be absolute," 18 5 and that it "must be considered against important state interests
in regulation." 1 86 Thus, the Court established a trimester framework to
govern the right to terminate a pregnancy. In the first trimester, "the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the
patient's pregnancy should be terminated."' 87 After the first trimester,
during the second trimester, "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health" 188 due to "the State's important
and legitimate interest in the health of the mother." 189 After viability,
during the third trimester, a State could propose legislation aimed at the
protection of fetal life and may even "go so far as to proscribe abortion
during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother,"' 190 because "the fetus then presumably has the
19 1 thus makcapability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb,"'
ing state regulation protecting potential fetal life after viability justifiable both logically and biologically.' 9 2
The concurrence by Justice Stewart reemphasized the argument that
there are liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that are not explicitly mentioned therein.1 93 Reasoning that,
"[i]n a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed,"' 9 4 Justice Stewart cites Justice Harlan in concluding,
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
See id.
See id. at 168-69 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 168 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)).
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cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution .... It is a rational

continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ... and which

also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs
95
asserted to justify their abridgement.'
Ultimately, it has been said that Roe "may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule . .. of personal autonomy and

bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on
governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its
rejection."' 9 6
3.

THE EVOLUTION BEGINS, BUT THE HOLDING IS REAFFIRMED:
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA

V. CASEY

While retaining and ultimately reaffirming the essential holding of
Roe v. Wade,' 97 the Supreme Court "reversed its position on several

[issues in Roe] in 1992 when it altered abortion jurisprudence by
announcing and applying a new standard of review" 198 in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 99 In this "seminal
case . .. the Court affirmed the right to choose but discarded Roe's

trimester framework because it misconceived the theoretical nature of
the woman's interest and undervalued the State's interest in potential life
in practice. ' '2 0 Casey, instead of focusing as much on Roe's right of
privacy encompassing the right to terminate a pregnancy (within the trimester framework), made "paramount" the "decisional autonomy rationale" 20 1: a "right of autonomy over one's own body as well as autonomy
in making certain important decisions. 20 2 The opinions of O'Connor,
Souter, Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens all "invoked a right to 'bodily
integrity' enumerated in no clause of the Constitution. ' 20 3 Thus, Casey
represented a shift from Roe in embracing "a more general autonomy
and right to choose, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro195. Id. at 169 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
196. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
197. Id. at 846.
198. Soares, supra note 7, at 101.
199. 505 U.S. 833.
200. Soares, supra note 7, at 1101.
201. Hill, supra note 135, at 310.
202. Id. at 311.
203. Kreimer, supra note 160, at 438.
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cess Clause's guarantee of liberty.
Casey, taken at face value, concerned a challenge to five provisions
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.205 Beyond this superficial challenge, however, Casey also concerned a challenge to overturn
the basic tenet of Roe v. Wade, guaranteeing the right to have an abortion. This prompted the Court to begin by stating that the Court's "obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code,"2 ° 6 and then to discuss, at length, the reasons for upholding Roe v.
Wade as valuable and legitimate precedent, 20 7 ultimately concluding that
"[i]t is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original
decision, and we do so today. 2 °8
Drawing a line at viability, 0 9 the joint opinion restated that "it is a
constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate
her pregnancy ' 2 10 and that "[t]he woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a
rule of law and a component of liberty [the Court] cannot renounce. 2 1
The joint opinion was willing, however, to reject the trimester framework articulated in Roe, which it did not consider to be a part of Roe's
essential holding. 21 2 The Court in Casey also made another significant
divergence from Roe in changing the standard of review for abortion
restrictions and legislation, which arguably "made abortion more susceptible to regulation and restriction."'2 1 3 The joint opinion declared that
204. Soares, supra note 7, at 1102.
205. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
206. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
207. See id. at 854-69. The joint opinion listed a series of considerations designed to test "the
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case," id. at 854; noted that "[n]o evolution
of legal principle has left Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973," id. at 857;
stated that, while Roe "has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable," id. at 860;
emphasized the need for the Court to retain its legitimacy through adherence to precedent, id. at
866; and ultimately concluded that "[a] decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the
existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and
unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's Commitment to the rule of

law," id. at 869.
208. Id. at 869.
209. Id. at 870 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). A line was drawn at
viability for two reasons: because of (1) the doctrine of stare decisis and because (2)
the concept of viability ... is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state
protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.

Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 873.
Soares, supra note 7, at 1104.
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"[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's
ability to make [the decision to have an abortion] does the power of the
State reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."2 14
The new "undue burden" standard articulated by the joint opinion
was determined to be "the appropriate means of reconciling the State's
interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty." ' 5 A finding of an undue burden was defined by the joint opinion as "shorthand
for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus." ' 6 Thus, combining the aforementioned discussion
of drawing a line at viability and discussion of the change in the standard of review to that of an undue burden, the joint opinion summarized
that an undue burden exists, and a provision of law would be invalid "if
its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."2'17
While the Court in Casey did reject the trimester framework of Roe
and did change the standard of review to the undue-burden standard, it is
important to note what was reaffirmed and kept intact in the decision.
Even with the adoption of the undue-burden standard, the Court is
explicit in noting that that "does not disturb the central holding of Roe v.
Wade, and [it] reaffirm[s] that holding. Regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy
before viability."21 8 Additionally, the joint opinion is explicit in upholding another central tenet of Roe, so much so as to use Roe's exact language in reaffirming the holding: that "subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."21 9 The fact that the Court in Casey, while still
making significant changes to the doctrine propounded in Roe v. Wade,
thought to explicitly retain Roe's "health or life" exception will become
22 0 Not
very important in the later discussion of Gonzales v. Carhart.
only does the Court in Casey unambiguously reaffirm Roe's health or
214.
added);
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Casey, 505 U.S.
see also Soares,
Casey, 505 U.S.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id. (quoting Roe
127 S. Ct. 1610

at 874 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (emphasis
supra note 7, at 1101-02.
at 876 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
(2007).
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life exception, but the Court goes further to reiterate that one of the
essential holdings of Roe forbids state interferences with a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing the pregnancy
would be a threat to her health.2 2
Despite having changed the standard of review to the undue-burden
standard, the Court is careful to emphasize that "[1]egislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose
conduct it affects, 2 2 2 and that "[t]he proper focus of constitutional
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant. '223 The Court in Casey also went to great
lengths to refocus the discussion of the rights involved to emphasize
"the right of autonomy over one's own body as well as autonomy in
making certain important decisions. 2 2 4 In discussing one of the challenged Pennsylvania provisions-the spousal notification requirementthe Court emphasized that, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. '22 5 The Court also stated that views regarding women as the
"center of home and family life" 226 or as having "no legal existence
separate from her husband" 227 and thus "preclud[ing] full and independent legal status under the Constitution"2 2 8 "are no longer consistent
with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution. ' 229 Thus, the Court struck down the spousal notification provision,
reasoning that it "embodies a view of marriage . . . repugnant to our
present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured
by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected
liberty when they marry. 2 3 °
The concurrence written by Justice Blackmun, the author of the
majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, went even further to emphasize the
autonomy rationale. In a passionate concurrence in part, concurrence in
the judgment in part, and dissent in part, Justice Blackmun stated that,
"when the State restricts a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, it
deprives a woman of the right to make her own decision about reproduction and family planning-critical life choices that this Court long has
221. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164).
222. Id. at 894.

223. Id.
224. Hill, supra note 135, at 311; see supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
225. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
226. Id. at 897 (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
227. Id. (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 898.
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deemed central to the right of privacy." 2 3 ' Amplifying the argument,
Justice Blackmun posited that restrictions on the right of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy "implicate constitutional guarantees of gender
equality,' 2 32 by compelling them to continue a pregnancy they might
otherwise terminate and therefore "conscript[ing] women's bodies into
[State] service. '"233 The assumption that women can be forced into constructive service to the State by compelling them to produce children
when their rights to have an abortion are limited, Justice Blackmun concludes, "appears to rest upon a conception of women's role that has trig23 4 Thus, in
gered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.
recognizing that "women's ability 'to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives,' ",235 "Casey linked the abortion right to
the constitutional prohibition against government assigning women the
traditional, gendered social roles of wife and mother-a prohibition that
'
is increasingly understood to lie at the heart of equal protection. "236
Finally, it is important to note another aspect of Justice Blackmun's
concurrence, as it comes to play a role in the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhartin 2007. Justice Blackmun is prescient in his critique of
the dissent's advocacy for the use of the rational-basis test for abortion
regulations, 2 37 as well as for the use of "an insurmountable requirement
for facial challenges: Petitioners must 'show that no set of circumstances
238 Ironically, in
exists under which the [provision] would be valid.' ,,
Gonzales v. Carhart, fifteen years later, the Court reasons that the
absence of a health exception in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act does
not render the statute unconstitutional on its face because "respondents
have not demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large
fraction of relevant cases. 2 39 While the language used in the dissent in
Casey and in the majority opinion in Carhart is not identical, both
appear to ignore Casey's rule that "[t]he proper focus of constitutional
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
231. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
232. Id. at 928.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education,
Contraceptive Access, and Work-Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 945 (2007) (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 835).
236. Id. at 945-46.
237. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 941 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 942 (alteration in original).
239. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
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whom the law is irrelevant"24 by focusing instead on hypothetical subsets of the population for which the statute would not be
unconstitutional.
4.

LAST DANCE BEFORE GONZALES V. CARHART:
STENBERG V. CARHART AND HEALTH EXCEPTIONS

The last major Supreme Court decision concerning abortion regulation before Carhart,and the one most closely related to Gonzales v.
2 4 ' Stenberg
Carhart, is the 2000 decision of Stenberg v. Carhart.
involved a challenge to a Nebraska law banning so-called partial birth
abortion,24 2 which the Court ultimately held to be unconstitutional.24 3
The Court noted the "controversial nature" 244 of the abortion issue, but
stated that they would not "revisit [the] legal principles 24 5 of a
woman's right to choose, but rather would use three established principles to determine the case:
First, before "viability ...the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy."
Second, "a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal
life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before
240. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
241. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
242. Id. at 921-22. These statutes ban "so-called" partial birth abortions because, in actuality,
there is no medical term called "partial birth abortion." Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion:
Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything To Lose, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 2004, at 33, 33. In
relevant part, the statute is described in detail by the Court as follows:
"No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such
procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury,
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself."
The statute defines "partial birth abortion" as:
"an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the
unborn child and completing the delivery."
It fulrther defines "nartially delivers, vaginally a iving unborn child before killing ,he
unborn child" to mean
"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living
unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of
performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure
knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child."
The law classifies violation of the statute as a "Class III felony" carrying a prison
term of up to 20 years, and a fine of up to $25,000. It also provides for the automatic
revocation of a doctor's license to practice medicine in Nebraska.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921-22 (citations omitted) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-105, 28326(9), 28-328(1)-(2), 28-328(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 1999)).
243. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.
244. Id. at 920.
245. Id. at 921.
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fetal viability" is unconstitutional. An "undue burden is... shorthand
for the conclusion that a state regnlation [sic] has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." '
Third, "'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.' ,246
The Court then proceeded to describe in detail the various abortion procedures that are performed during the second trimester of pregnancy,
including the one banned by the Nebraska statute: a variation of a standard dilation and evacuation (D&E)24 7 procedure called "intact D&E,"
or "dilation and extraction" (D&X). 248 To summarize briefly, the D&E
procedure involves the dilation of the cervix and, after the fifteenth week
of pregnancy, "the potential need for ...

disarticulation or dismember-

ment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate evacuation
from the uterus"' 249 with medical instruments. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Breyer, was careful to note that the D&E procedure
carries certain risks: "The use of instruments within the uterus creates a
danger of accidental perforation and damage to neighboring organs.
Sharp fetal-bone fragments create similar dangers. And fetal tissue accidentally left behind can cause infection and various other complications. ' 250 An effort to avoid these risks is made by attempting to use the
procedure banned by the Nebraska statute: the intact D&E procedure.
Like the standard D&E procedure, intact D&E begins with the dilation of the cervix, at which point the procedure "involves removing the
fetus from the uterus through the cervix 'intact,' i.e., in one pass, rather
than in several passes."' 25' The procedure is used after the sixteenth week
of pregnancy, at which point the fetal skull has become too large to pass
through the cervix. Thus, depending on the presentation of the fetus, the
intact D&E procedure proceeds in one of two ways. "If the fetus
246. Id. (citations omitted).
247. The standard D&E procedure is the "most commonly used procedure" during the second
trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 924. This standard procedure "involves (1) dilation of the cervix; (2)
removal of at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments, and (3) (after the 15th week)
the potential need for instrumental disarticulation or dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of
fetal parts to facilitate evacuation from the uterus." Id. at 925.
248. The Court states that "intact D&E and D&X are sufficiently similar for us to use the terms
interchangeably." Id. at 928. In contrast to the standard D&E procedure, intact D&E "involves
removing the fetus from the uterus 'intact,' i.e., in one pass, rather than in several passes. It is used
after 16 weeks at the earliest." Id. at 927 (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 925.
250. Id. at 926.
251. Id. at 927.

20081

THE PARTIAL TERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE

367

presents head first[,] . . . the doctor collapses the skull; and the doctor
' "If the
then extracts the entire fetus through the cervix." 252
fetus presents
feet first[,] . . . the doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix. 25 3 The potential benefits of using the intact D&E procedure include "reduc[ing] the
dangers from sharp bone fragments passing through the cervix, ...
minimiz[ing] the number of instrument passes needed for extraction and
lessen[ing] the likelihood of uterine perforations caused by those instruments, . . . reduc[ing] the likelihood of leaving infection-causing fetal
and placental tissue in the uterus," 254 and the possibility of "prevent[ing]
potentially fatal absorption of fetal tissue into the maternal circulation, '"255 in addition to potential benefits "in circumstances involving
nonviable fetuses" for women with prior uterine scars, 25 6 "or for women
for whom induction of labor would be particularly dangerous. 25 7 In
light of these benefits, the Court notes that the District Court had concluded that "the evidence is both clear and convincing that [the intact
D&E] procedure is superior to, and safer than, the . . . other abortion
'25 8
procedures used during the relevant gestational period.
The Court, after summarizing the medical procedures involved in
the Nebraska statute, proceeded quickly to conclude that the statute violated the Constitution for at least two independent reasons. The first of
those reasons was because "the law lacks any exception 'for the preservation of the ... health of the mother,' "259 and the second was because
it "'imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability' to choose a D&E
abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion
260
itself.
The independent reason for striking down the Nebraska statute
based on the lack of a health exception is highly significant and, indeed,
is certainly emphasized and expounded in impressive detail by the
majority opinion. The Court cites Casey for its reiteration of Roe that
"subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 928.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 929.

257. Id.
258. Id. at 928-29 (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1126 (D. Neb. 1998),
afftd, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), affd, 530 U.S. 914).
259. Id. at 930 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
260. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.)).
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tion except where it is necessary, in appropriatemedical judgment, for
the preservationof the life or health of the mother.' '2 6' The fact that the
same language is being used by the Court in Stenberg that was used in
both Casey and in Roe is arguably demonstrative of its significance in
abortion jurisprudence, since it had been retained and recited for twentyseven years at the time Stenberg was decided; clearly, the importance of
a health exception had not escaped the attention of the Court. Justice
Breyer emphasizes that point by stating that, "[s]ince the law requires a
health exception in order to validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect to previability regulation, ' both of which were impacted by the Nebraska statute at issue.
In noting that the Nebraska statute does not actually promote a
State interest in the potentiality of human life because it does not save a
single fetus from destruction, but rather regulates only a method of performing abortion,26 3 the Court concludes that
the governing standard requires an exception "where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother," for this Court has made clear that a State may
promote but not endanger a woman's health when it regulates the
methods of abortion.26 4
Additionally, the Court dismisses Nebraska's claim that a health exception is not required "unless there is a need," 265 which is not the case here
because there are safe alternatives available, by concluding that "[t]he
State fails to demonstrate that banning D&X without a health exception
may not create significant health risks for women, because the record
shows that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in
2 66
Most sigsome circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure.
nificantly, perhaps, the Court notes that the District Court found that "a
select panel of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
concluded that D&X may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a
particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a
261. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973))).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 931 (citation omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 932. For example, the District Court found that the procedure "reduces operating
time, blood loss and risk of infection; reduces complications from bony fragments; reduces
instrument-inflicted damage to the uterus and cervix; prevents the most common causes of
maternal mortality (DIC and amniotic fluid embolus); and eliminates the possibility of 'horrible
complications' arising from retained fetal parts." Id. (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, II F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1126 (D. Neb. 1998), affd, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), aftid, 530 U.S. 914).
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267

woman."
Further, the Court concluded that the infrequency of the D&X procedure did not justify Nebraska's lack of a health exception and that the
procedure's relative rarity was "not highly relevant. '268 Reasoning that
"the health exception question is whether protecting women's health
requires an exception for those infrequent occasions, 26 9 the Court concludes that "[a] rarely used treatment might be necessary to treat a rarely
occurring disease that could strike anyone-the State cannot prohibit a
person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing out that most people
do not need it."'270 Further, the Court stated that "[t]he word 'necessary'
in Casey's phrase 'necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother,' cannot refer to an absolute necessity or to absolute proof'; 27 1 "[n]either can that phrase require
unanimity of medical opinion. '"272 Instead,
[w]here a significant body of medical opinion believes a procedure
may bring with it greater safety for some patients and explains the
medical reasons supporting that view, we cannot say that the presence of a different view by itself proves the contrary. Rather, the
uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who believe that
D&X is a safer abortion method in certain circumstances may turn
out to be right. If so, then the absence of a health exception will place
women at an unnecessary risk of tragic health consequences. If they
are wrong, the exception will simply turn out to have been
unnecessary.2 73
In determining that Nebraska had failed to convince the Court that
a health exception was never necessary, the Court again reiterated the
importance of a health exception. Dismissing the dissent's concern that
health exceptions give doctors "unfettered discretion" in the selection of
abortion procedures, Justice Breyer concluded that, "where substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular
abortion procedure could endanger women's health, Casey requires the
statute to include a health exception when the procedure is necessary, in
apppnat-- m edical judgment, for the preservation of the life nr health
274
of the mother.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence also emphasized the essential need
267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 n.10).
268. Id. at 934.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 937 (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for a health exception in abortion regulations. O'Connor arguably took
the argument requiring a health exception a step further than the majority, explicitly stating that, "[b]ecause even a postviability proscriptionof
abortion would be invalid absent a health exception, Nebraska's ban on
previability partial birth abortions.., must include a health exception as
well, since the State's interest in regulating abortions before viability is
'considerably weaker' than after viability." '75 Thus, Justice O'Connor is
stating that "she would not consider a ban on partial-birth abortion constitutional without a health exception."2'76 Significantly, even when Justice O'Connor provided clear instructions for legislators were they to try
to pass a similar statute in the future-by stating that "a ban on partial
birth abortion that only proscribed the D&X method of abortion and that
included an exception to preserve the life and health of the mother
O'Connor still
would be constitutional in [her] view" 2 7 7-Justice
emphasized the need for a health exception.
Compared to its highly detailed and thorough examination of the
absolute need for a health exception and the explanation of why the
Nebraska statute failed in the absence of one, the majority opinion added
another rationale for striking down the statute based on the undue-burden standard in what appears to be a jurisprudential afterthought.
Because the language of the statute is vague, thus making it difficult to
distinguish between the D&E and D&X, and because the language of the
statute does not choose to remedy this deficiency by tracking the medical differences between the two procedures, the Court concludes that the
plain language of the statute is meant to encompass both procedures.2 78
Further supporting this conclusion, the language in question was based
upon model statutory language that had been found by ten lower federal
courts to be "potentially applicable to other abortion procedures" other
than D&X.27 9
Thus, the Court's decision in Stenberg in 2000 left little doubt that
the need for a health exception was "of special import. '2 8 ° Essentially,
"Stenberg declared that all abortion regulations must contain exceptions
for the health of the mother in order to be found constitutional. 28 '
Indeed, in all three Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality
275. Id. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
276. Alex Gordon, Recent Development, The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 501, 512 (2004).
277. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 939 (majority opinion).
279. Id. at 941.
280. Note, After Ayotte: The Need To Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed "Purpose," 119
HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2557 (2006).
281. Soares, supra note 7, at I 118.
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of abortion regulations lacking a health exception, the Court has held
"that a health exception must be provided when a law restricts access to
abortion. ' 8 2 It is against that background that we proceed to examine
the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: a statute that lacks
the exact type of health exception required by the Supreme Court in
Stenberg, Casey, and Roe.
C.

The Federal Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003

It has only been little more than a decade since the legality of lateterm abortions began to generate controversy.2 8 3 The federal PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA) was the "third time in eight
years that Congress attempted to ban the procedure referred to as 'partial-birth abortion,' ,284 and was signed into law by President G.W. Bush
in 2003.285 The PBABA bans a variation of the standard D&E procedure, which is the most common abortion procedure during the second
trimester. 28 6 The banned variation "of this procedure involves a physician partially delivering the fetus intact until part of it passes the vagina,
where it is then aborted. '287 This procedure is inaccurately termed "partial-birth abortion" in the PBABA and by anti-choice activists, but is
referred to either "intact D&E" or "intact D&X" in the medical
community.2 8 8
Under the PBABA, "any physician who, in or affecting interstate
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion, and thereby
kills a human fetus, shall be fined, imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both." 28 9 The PBABA defines partial-birth abortion as when
"the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally
vaginally delivers a living fetus . . . for the purpose of performing an
overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living
fetus. ' 290 Significantly, following Carhart, this was the "first [time] in
282. Id. at 1111. These cases were Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914; Planned Parenthood of
8.331.992); and Thornburgh v. American College
5.S
505y,
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
283. See Soares, supra note 7, at 1114.

284. Gordon, supra note 276, at 501. President Clinton vetoed similar bills passed by Congress
in 1996 and 1997. Id.; see also Center for Reproductive Rights: Legislative History of the Federal
Abortion Ban, http://www.reproductiverights.org/hill-pri-pba.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008)
(detailing history of federal abortion laws).
285. Kessler, supra note 18, at 524.
286. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2007).
287. Kessler, supra note 18, at 523.
288. Id. at 523-24.
289. Gordon, supra note 276, at 502.
290. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3, 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 153 1(b)).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:339

which the [C]ourt has upheld a ban on a specific method of abortion."2 9 1
Even more significantly, and similarly to the unconstitutional Nebraska
statute in Stenberg, 92 the PBABA does not contain a health exception, 93 and therefore also represents the first time in which the Court
has "ruled that an abortion restriction is constitutional despite the lack of
a health exception" since Roe.29 4
Legal challenges to the PBABA "began almost immediately. 2 9 5
The three federal trials challenging the PBABA began on March 29,
2004.296 All three of those federal courts "found the statute unconstitutional because it lacked a health exception, ' 297 and one of the courts also
struck down the statute "because it imposed an undue burden and was
too vague. '298 Two of those federal cases, Carhartv. Gonzales299 and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales,3 °° gave
rise to the Supreme Court case of Gonzales v. Carhart.°1
III.

GONZALES V. CARHART: UNPRECEDENTED DIRECTIONS IN

ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

A.

The Cases Giving Rise to Gonzales v. Carhart:
The Factual Underpinnings

Carhartv. Gonzales is the first of the two federal cases that gave
rise to the Supreme Court decision of Gonzales v. Carhart.In Carhartv.
Gonzales, a group of plaintiff doctors who performed the banned abortion procedure filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
PBABA.3 °2 The district court held the PBABA unconstitutional 30 3 and
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting "the Attorney General from
enforcing the Act in all cases but those in which there was no dispute the
fetus was viable. ' 3° Primarily using the Supreme Court's decision in
291. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
292. Hill, supra note 135, at 319.
293. E.g., Soares, supra note 7, at 1118.
294. After Gonzales v. Carhart: The Future of Abortion Jurisprudence,PEw F., June 14, 2007,
http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=149 (transcribing statement of Eve Gartner, Senior Staff
Attorney, Planned Parenthood Federation of America).
295. Gordon, supra note 276, at 513.
296. Gorney, supra note 242, at 34.
297. Soares, supra note 7, at 1119.

298. Id.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
127 S. Ct. 1610.
See 413 F.3d at 792.
Id.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.
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Stenberg, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision and held
the PBABA unconstitutional.3 °5
Throughout the opinion, the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on the
fact that the PBABA lacks a health exception to hold the statute unconstitutional. The court cited and agreed with the Fourth Circuit in declaring that "Stenberg established the health exception requirement as a per
se constitutional rule" 30 6 for "all abortion statutes, without regard to precisely how the statute regulates abortion."3 7 The court concluded that
the record in the instant case was similar to the record in Stenberg "in all
significant respects. ' 30 8 Stenberg, concluded the Eighth Circuit, requires
"a health exception whenever 'substantial medical authority' supports
the medical necessity of the prohibited procedure. ' 30 9 Thus, the court
reasoned, since Stenberg established that "'substantial medical authority' supports the conclusion that the banned procedures obviate health
risks in certain situations, ' even where "no consensus exists in the
medical community,"3 1 a health exception is required, and PBABA is
unconstitutional in its absence.
The other case that gave rise to Gonzales v. Carhartwas Planned
ParenthoodFederation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales.31 2 In this case, the
Planned Parenthood entities filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California seeking "to enjoin enforcement of
the Act."' 313 In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit held
that the PBABA was "unconstitutional for three distinct reasons, each of
which [was] sufficient to justify the district court's holding"3' 14 : (1) "the
Act lack[ed] the constitutionally required health exception, ' 3 15 (2) "it
impose[d] an undue burden on women's ability to obtain previability
abortions,' 316 and (3) "it [was] unconstitutionally vague, depriving physicians of fair notice of what it prohibits and encouraging arbitrary
enforcement. 3 17
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that "Stenberg reaffirms Casey's
305..Cwaat, 43 1.3a 792

306. Id. at 796 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Richmond Med. Ctr.
for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2005)).
307. Id.

308. Id. at
309. Id. at
310. Id. at
311. Id. at
312.
(2007).
313.
314.
315.

803.
797.
801-02.

802.

435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.
Planned Parenthood, 435 F.3d at 1171.
Id.

316. Id.
317. Id.at 1171-72.
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holding that the Constitution requires that any abortion regulation must
contain such an exception if the use of the otherwise regulated procedure
may in some instances be necessary to preserve a woman's life or
health."3" 8 The court noted that there was no medical consensus as to
whether the intact D&E procedure is in fact "'necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."' 3 19 Addressing this lack of consensus, the court cited Stenberg
for the proposition that "as long as there is a lack of consensus in [the
medical] community, any regulation of an abortion method must contain
a health exception. '32 0 Thus, even in light of congressional findings that
"the facts indicate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman," and that a "moral, medical, and ethical
consensus" exists that partial-birth abortion is "never medically necessary and should be prohibited,' 32' a health exception is required because
"[t]he record before Congress clearly demonstrates that no such consensus exists, as do the congressional findings themselves, 3 22 and,
"[w]ithout a medical consensus, . . . it is impossible for a legislative
body to determine that 'a health exception is never necessary to preserve
the health of women,' and, in such circumstance, any abortion regulation
the legislature enacts without a health exception is unconstitutional. '32 3
The court, indeed, seemed particularly bothered by the congressional findings in the PBABA that a medical consensus exists when, in
fact, one does not. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[e]ven the most cursory
review of the [PBABA] and the congressional record" 324 reveals that
"[t]he evidence of the lack of medical consensus is replete ... and is
confirmed in a significant statutory finding. ' 32 5 The court concludes that
"[t]he evidence before Congress at the time it passed the [PBABA]...
has led every court that has considered the statute's constitutionality to
conclude that no medical consensus exists that the abortion procedures
outlawed by the [PBABA] are never necessary to preserve the health of
a woman-and we agree. '"326
The Ninth Circuit also explained that the PBABA failed because it
places an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose a previability
abortion. Again referring to Stenberg, the court states that a statute fail318. Id. at 1172.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1171.
1172.
1169 (emphasis omitted).
1174.
1172-73.
1175.
1174.
1174-75.
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ing to distinguish between intact D&Es and non-intact D&Es in its statutory language would constitute an undue burden because "it would
prohibit most second trimester abortions. '"327 Indeed, the court states that
PBABA "fails to differentiate between [intact D&Es and non-intact
D&Es] sufficiently clearly to permit doctors to perform the latter procedure without fear of prosecution. 3 28 The court contends that, since Congress, in drafting the PBABA, deliberately failed to follow Justice
O'Connor's roadmap for legislatures wishing to avoid the problems of
the Nebraska statute 32 9 and gave no explanation for doing so, 3 3 0 the
PBABA is unconstitutional because it would allow prosecutors to pursue
D&Es and would have a chilling effect
non-intact
physicians performing 33
1
on abortion providers.
Lastly, and related to Congress's failing to adequately distinguish
between intact D&Es and non-intact D&Es in its statutory language, the
33 2
court concludes that the PBABA is also unconstitutionally vague.
Because the "need to avoid vagueness is particularly acute when the
statute imposes criminal penalties, or when it implicates constitutionally
protected rights, 3 33 the PBABA is unconstitutionally vague because
"the language of the statute, taken as a whole, is not sufficiently clear
regarding what it permits and prohibits to guide the conduct of those
affected by its terms, specifically medical practitioners. 33 4 Ultimately
concluding that, "[h]ere, Congress, notwithstanding existing Supreme
Court law and the multiple opportunities it was given to limit the Act's
scope, passed an overly broad ban that it was aware likely violated the
Constitution as construed by the Court,' 3 3 5 the court upheld the permanent injunction against the PBABA.33 6
Following the rulings of the Eighth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,
both holding the PBABA unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari for both cases, and addressed them together in Gonzales v.
Carhart.
327. Id. at 1176.
328. Id. at 1180.
329. See id. at 1177.
330. Id. at 1177-78.
331. See id. at 1177 ("Because the Act, like the statute invalidated in Stenberg, would allow
prosecutors to pursue physicians who 'use [non-intact] D & E procedures, the most commonly
used method for performing previability second trimester abortions' and would cause all doctors
performing those procedures to 'fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment,' it too is
unconstitutional." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
332. Id. at 1181.
333. Id. (citation omitted).
334. Id. at 1181-82.
335. ld. at 1189.
336. Id. at 1184-85.
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B. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion:
A Lesson in Ignoring Both Reality and Precedent
1.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, JUST GETTING STARTED ...

The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, begins in much
the same way as the lower federal court decisions holding the PBABA
unconstitutional-by describing in full detail the various abortion procedures involved in the litigation.3 37 After explaining the standard D&E
(non-intact D&E) procedure in unnecessarily graphic detail,3 38 and then
summarizing the procedural history in the lower courts, 339 Justice Kennedy began the majority's discussion of the merits of the case.
Wasting no time in rejecting the conclusions of the lower courts,
Justice Kennedy states that a central premise of Casey-"that the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life-would be repudiated were the Court now to affirm the
judgments of the Courts of Appeals."34 The majority opinion offers a
succinct summary of the three essential parts of Roe's holding that were
reaffirmed in Casey: all three of which are "implicated in the instant
cases." 341 The three-part holding of Roe that is affirmed states,
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State. Before viability, the State's interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And third is
the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict
337. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620-23 (2007).
338. Throughout the opinion, Justice Kennedy uses arguably loaded and suggestive language
that is atypical of descriptions involving medical procedures to describe the abortion procedures
involved in the litigation. See Allison Stevens, A Major Blow to Roe, Ms., Summer 2007, at 34,
35 ("Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy peppered his ruling with
language sympathetic to the anti-choice position ....
). This language includes talking about
friction that "causes the fetus to tear apart," Carhart,127 S. Ct. at 1621; legs being "ripped off the
fetus," id.; doctors being able to "kill the fetus," id.; a doctor "ripping [the fetus] apart," id. at
1622; a prolonged transcription of a nurse's emotion-laden reaction to observing an intact D&E
procedure, recalling the "baby's little fingers ... clasping and unclasping," and describing the
procedure as "suck[ing] the baby's brains out," id.; and physicians "crush[ing] a fetus' skull," id.
at 1623.
339. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1625-26.
340. Id. at 1626.
341. Id.
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342
one another; and we adhere to each.
While all three parts of Roe's essential holding are cited by the
Court, Justice Kennedy appears to gloss over the first two to stress that
"it is the third that requires the most extended discussion; for we must
determine whether the Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child. 34 3 This
is an especially ironic statement to begin the majority opinion's discussion of the merits in light of the fact that the majority opinion is examining the constitutionality of a statute that "saves not a single fetus from
destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion. '3 44
Apparently missing this irony, the Court continues its review of abortion
jurisprudence by assuming various principles set forth in Casey.34 5 This
is perhaps the first sign that Justice Kennedy is prepared to minimize the
impact and effect of abortion precedent: The fact that "the central holdings of Roe and Casey-that a woman has a right to make the ultimate
decision to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability, and that the state
only 'assumed' by
may not impose an undue burden on that right-were
3 46
the majority, not stated as controlling law."
The Court proceeds with its examination of the PBABA, concluding that "[a] straightforward reading of the Act's text demonstrates its
purpose and the scope of its provisions: It regulates and proscribes, with
exceptions or qualifications... the intact D & E procedure. 3' 47 Notwithstanding protests by the Respondents that "the Act is void for vagueness
because its scope is indefinite," the Court concludes that "the Act is not
void for vagueness, does not impose an undue burden from any overbreadth, and is not invalid on its face. 348

2.

RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE MEDICAL PROFESSION:
SAVING DOCTORS FROM THEMSELVES

The majority opinion states that the PBABA "defines the unlawful

abortion in explicit terms, ' '3 49 and "provides doctors 'of ordinary intelli342. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Posting of Geoffrey R. Stone to Huffington
Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (Apr. 20, 2007, 14:45 EST) ("It is important to note that the
prohibition of intact D & E has nothing to do with preserving the life of a fetus.").
345. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1626.
346. Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, supra note 15.
347. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627.
348. Id.
349. Id. These "explicit terms" are (1) "the person performing the abortion must 'vaginally
delive[r] a living fetus,'" id. at 1627; (2) by definition "partial-birth abortion requires the fetus to
be delivered 'until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body
of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is
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gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,'1, 35 0 thus
defeating the void-for-vagueness requirement that "a penal statute define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ' 35' Thus, the
respondents failed to show that the Act should be invalidated on its face
due to the void-for-vagueness doctrine and additionally "failed to show
that the Act should be invalidated on its face because it encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement."3'5 2 Unfortunately, while this sentiment is certainly convenient to support the Court's conclusions, it does
not appear to reflect reality, or the findings of the courts below. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit in Planned Parenthood stated explicitly that,
"[b]ecause the Act, like the statute invalidated in Stenberg . . . would
cause all'doctors performing those procedures to 'fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment,' it too is unconstitutional. 3 5 3 Additionally,
there is abundant evidence that doctors of ordinary intelligence, indeed,
do not clearly understand what is and what is not within the parameters
of the PBABA.35 4
Ultimately, if a criminal statute banning a specific medical procedure is unclear or vague, it will have serious repercussions for the medical profession. As the Ninth Circuit found, the PBABA's vagueness will
cause doctors to "fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. 3 5 5
An added complication in this situation is the fact that doctors are never
able to "predict beforehand whether they will be able ultimately to
35 7
remove the fetus intact. 356 For the potential health risks discussed,
abortion providers not only might, but should, try to remove the fetus
using as few instrument passes as possible. Thus, it is feasible that, in a
procedure in which the doctor does not actually believe it is possible to
outside'" the mother's body, id.; (3) "to fall within the Act, a doctor must perform an 'oven act,
other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus,"' id.; and (4) "the
Act contains scienter requirements concerning all the actions involved in the prohibited abortion,"
id. at 1628.
350. Id. at 1628.
351. LId.
352. Id. at 1629.
353. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted), rev'd sub nom. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
354. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 338, at 34 (interviewing a doctor, who reported that he
recommended an alternative abortion method to a patient than what he felt most appropriate
because he "feared that... he might be perceived as violating" the PBABA); Harris, supra note
18 ("One thing that could complicate clinics' 'compliance strategy' is the ruling's convoluted
language about exactly what is outlawed.").
355. Planned Parenthood, 435 F.3d at 1177.
356. Id. at 1168.
357. See infra note 409.
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perform an intact D&E, thus removing that doctor from the parameters
of the PBABA, the doctor will actually end up performing an intact
D&E inadvertently simply in trying to minimize the number of passes
into the uterus with instruments for the sake of the comfort and safety of
the patient, and because doctors cannot be sure how much the cervix
will dilate.
Justice Kennedy attempts to address this concern by saying that this
reasoning "does not take account of the Act's intent requirements, which
preclude liability from attaching to an accidental intact D & E."35 8 Justice Kennedy then distinguishes doctors who may perform the procedure
accidentally, who are exempt from criminal prosecution, from doctors of
the type who testified at trial, whom Justice Kennedy claims "begin
every D & E abortion with the objective of removing the fetus as intact
as possible."35' 9 Thus, on one hand, a doctor who performs an intact
D&E "accidentally" will be free and clear of any criminal liability; on
the other hand, a doctor who makes the conscious decision to perform an
intact D&E will be subject to the criminal penalties of the PBABA. In
this scenario, no abortion provider would actually be willing to admit
they intended to perform an intact D&E, even if one were to occur during the procedure. Justice Kennedy's distinctions, then, encourage abortion providers to add another level of bureaucracy to their practice and to
obscure the truth behind their decisions in medical procedures. Feasibly,
abortion providers could continue performing intact D&Es, if only they
suspend the integrity Justice Kennedy seems so intent in protecting 360 to
lie about their intention in doing so. If they are all performed without the
requisite "intent," the PBABA indeed fails to proscribe intact D&Es, and
fails in accomplishing much of anything other than jeopardizing the
integrity of the medical profession in allowing doctors the freedom to
make educated decisions about medical procedures.
Additionally, if criminal penalties hinge on the "intent" of the doctor in choosing to perform the intact D&E procedure, how would that
standard be enforceable? As mentioned previously, doctors would have
an incentive to lie, even when performing an intact D&E by choice.
Would third parties be able to accuse abortion providers of intending to
perform intact D&Es in spite of the doctors' hypothetical protests that
she or he did not intend the procedure? Would this result in a Salemwitch-hunt prosecution of doctors who may or may not be intentionally
performing intact D&Es by anti-abortion activists and interest groups?
How would this intent, or lack thereof, be proven in court? The inconsis358. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1631.
359. Id. at 1632.
360. See infra text accompanying notes 376-78.
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tent and erratic nature of this standard is clearly troubling and problematic at best and certainly does not appear to provide "doctors 'of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.' ,, 36 ' Given these circumstances, it would be natural for doctors to
shy away from performing any procedure that might even be construed
as being within the parameters of the PBABA, resulting in an overall
"chilling" effect among abortion providers. Indeed, this appears to be
what is happening. 36 2
3.

TURNING OVER A NEW LEAF: ABANDONMENT
UNDUE-BURDEN

STANDARD

OF THE CASEY

FOR FACIAL CHALLENGES

The majority opinion next considered whether the PBABA constitutes an undue burden, as a facial matter, because its restrictions on second-trimester abortions are too broad. Although already having
answered its own question by stating that the PBABA defines the unlawful abortion procedure in "explicit terms," the Court reiterates that "[a]
review of the statutory text discloses the limits of its reach" 36 3: The
PBABA "prohibits intact D & E; and, notwithstanding respondents'
arguments, it does not prohibit the D & E procedure in which the fetus is
removed in parts. ' 364 The majority opinion compares the PBABA to the
Nebraska statute struck down in Stenberg and concludes that the
365
PBABA "departs in material ways from the statute in Stenberg"
enough to justify the PBABA being constitutional, whereas the
Nebraska statute was not, despite claims that they banned the same procedure. For example, the Court argues that the PBABA's language,
"unlike the statute in Stenberg, expresses the usual meaning of 'deliver'
when used in connection with 'fetus,' ,,36 6 and, thus, "the language does
not require a departure from the ordinary meaning," as the Court claims
was required in Stenberg.367 Additionally, the Court argues that the
PBABA is further differentiated from the Nebraska statute because the
PBABA includes "[t]he identification of specific anatomical landmarks
to which the fetus must be partially delivered, '3 68 and because PBABA
"makes the distinction the Nebraska statute failed to draw ... by differentiating between the overall partial-birth abortion and the distinct overt
361. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1628.
362. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 18, at 526; Stevens, supra note 338, at 34; Supreme Court
Upholds FederalAbortion Ban, Opens Door for FurtherRestrictions by States, supra note 18, at
19.
363. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1629.

364. Id.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 1630.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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36
act that kills the fetus.
In the event that any or all of these differentiations drawn by the
Court could be refuted, which indeed they were by the lower federal
courts that considered the constitutionality of the PBABA,3 7 ° the Court
offers one last justification: the "canon of constitutional avoidance,"
which "extinguishes any lingering doubt as to whether the Act covers
the prototypical D & E procedure."3 7' Ignoring the observation by the
Ninth Circuit in Planned Parenthoodthat the "need to avoid vagueness
is particularly acute when the statute imposes criminal penalties, or
when it implicates constitutionally protected rights,"3'72 the Court instead
posits, "[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must
be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. '
The majority opinion further concludes that the PBABA does not
impose an undue burden and is thus not unconstitutional on those
grounds. Once again ignoring the fact that the statute does not further a
state's interest in the potentiality of human life because it does not prevent any abortions, Justice Kennedy issues the empty declaration that
"[t]he Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life,"37' 4 and states
that the "government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to
show its profound respect for the life within the woman."37' 5 Additionally, Justice Kennedy posits that the government "has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession"3 7' 6 and that
"[i]t was reasonable for Congress to think that partial-birth abortion,
more than standard D & E, 'undermines the public's perception of the
appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process, and perverts
377 Unfortua process during which life is brought into the world.' ,,
nately, this self-proclaimed noble effort to protect the medical profession
from itself ignores the fact that a great number of doctors who testified
at trial found the intact D&E procedure preferable, more appropriate,
and safer in some circumstances. 378 Thus, the medical profession's
integrity might be better preserved by providing the safest and most

369. Id. at 1630-31. The Court argues that "[t]his distinction matters because, unlike intact D
& E, standard D & E does not involve a delivery followed by a fatal act." Id. at 1631.
370. See discussion supra Part III.A.
371. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1631.
372. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted), rev'd sub nom. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
373. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1631 (alteration in original) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Ha. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
374. Id. at 1633.
375. Id.
376. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702,
731 (1997)).
377. Id. at 1635.
378. See id. at 1644-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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appropriate medical treatments rather than deferring to the preferences
of legislators.
Later in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy makes his complete
disregard for the Casey undue-burden standard more explicit by stating
that "facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first
instance," and that "the proper means to consider exceptions is by asapplied challenge."3 7 9 This is certainly a surprising statement, considering that facial challenges have been "how virtually every lawsuit challenging abortion restrictions since Roe has been brought and the court
has never before suggested that facial challenges were an inappropriate
way of bringing those challenges. '"380 This is initially "perplexing given
that, in materially identical circumstances [the Court] held that a statute
lacking a health exception was unconstitutional on its face."3 8' 1 Bringing
as-applied challenges as opposed to facial challenges to abortion restrictions are accompanied by a host of problems for those hoping to protect
abortion rights, including "mak[ing] litigation to protect a woman's
reproductive freedom much more expensive and difficult" and "hav[ing]
the perverse effect of making the fact that abortion regulations almost
invariably have much more impact on poor, rural women an argument in
'
their favor."382
This new standard becomes even more troubling, however, when
one realizes how far it strays from the precedent established in Casey.
Casey is known for establishing the undue-burden standard, which is
"shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus."38' 3 While claiming to use the undueburden standard in Carhart,Justice Kennedy in fact employs rationalbasis review38 4 : a much weaker standard of review, and one that has not
been used in relation to abortion regulations since Roe v. Wade was
decided in 1973. This did not escape the attention of Justice Ginsburg,
who wrote that, "[i]nstead of the heightened scrutiny we have previously
379. Id. at 1638 (majority opinion).
380. After Gonzales v. Carhart: The Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, supra note 294
(transcribing statement of Eve Gartner, Senior Staff Attorney, Planned Parenthood Federation of
America).
381. Carhart,127 S. Ct. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
382. Posting of Scott Lemieux to Lawyers, Guns and Money, http:/lefarkins.blogspot.com
(Apr. 18, 2007, 13:57 EST); see also Scott Lemieux, EndangeringRoe, Am.PROSPEcr, Dec. 2,
2005, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleld=10682 (noting possible impact on poor

women).
383. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
384. See Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1633 ("Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not
impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and
substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession
in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn." (emphasis added)).
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applied, the Court determines that a 'rational' ground is enough to
uphold the Act. '38 5 This casual use of a completely different and markedly lessened standard of review to examine an abortion regulation is, in
effect, the complete "evisceration"38' 6 of the Casey undue-burden
standard.
4.

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S "MOTHER AND CHILD REUNION": INJECTING

PATERNALISM AND MORAL CONCERNS INTO
THE CONSTITUTION

Justice Kennedy then takes the opportunity to lapse into what
appears to be an unconnected and completely unsubstantiated reflection
about motherhood. There has been considerable discussion regarding the
use of paternalistic language by Justice Kennedy throughout the majority opinion,38 7 and the way it "reflects ancient notions about women's
place in the family and under the Constitution-ideas that have long
since been discredited."3'88 Declaring, completely without support, that
"[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child,"3'89 the majority concludes that while the
Court 'find[s] no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
abort the infant life they once created and sustained,"3 90 and that
"[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow."3 9' 1 In doing so, Justice Kennedy not-so-subtly suggests that "a pregnant woman who
chooses abortion falls away from true womanhood."3 9' 2 Because "[i]n a
decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used,"'3 93
which is "likely the case with the abortion procedures here in issue, ' ' 3 9
the Court concludes that the State has an interest in "ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed."3 95 Justice Kennedy declares that
[i]t is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
385. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
386. Posting of Marty Lederman to SCOTUSblog, supra note 19; see also NAT'L WOMEN':"
LAW CTR., GONZALES V. CARHART: THE SUPREME COURT TuRNs ITS BACK ON WOMEN'S HEALTH
AND ON THREE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2007), available at http://www.nwlc.org/

pdf/GonzalesvCarhart2.pdf (noting the weakening of the undue-burden standard).
387. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 20; Lithwick, supra note 20.
388. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 1634 (majority opinion).
390. Id. (emphasis added).
391. Id.
392. Greenhouse, supra note 20.
393. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not
know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the
fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the
human form.39 6

Revealingly, this same rhetoric that claims "[w]omen . . . don't
really understand what they are doing when they decide to have abortions" has also been used by Operation Outcry: an anti-choice abortion
group.397 Its purpose is to "undermine the notion that women exercise
398
: a proposition
any kind of choice when they decide to have abortions"

that has clearly been demonstrated to not have any substantial or factual
support.3 9 9 This entire speculative discussion drips with what has been
referred to as the "new paternalism": "[E]ither a woman is crazy when
she undergoes an abortion, or she will become crazy later on." 40 0 Thus,
the Court, in ignoring Casey's statement that the Court's "obligation is
4 1
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code,"
instead chooses to criminalize an abortion procedure to protect women
from themselves: a shift in discourse that has been called "enormous"
and "beyond Alice in Wonderland."40 2
Moreover, while the natural and proper remedy for this situation
might appear to be "to inform the woman and then let her decide if she
wants to undergo the intact D&E procedure,"40 3 the Court instead concludes that the procedure should just be banned. In this regard, Justice
Kennedy's opinion "blossoms from the premise that if all women were
as sensitive as he is about the fundamental awfulness of this procedure,
they'd all refuse to undergo it. Since they aren't, he'll decide for
them. 40 4 This argument "suggests that the state could take the lesser
step of requiring doctors to inform the woman about all the details of the
D&E procedure she will have to undergo and about what will happen to
the fetus," which might have the consequence of opening "the door for
states to pass increasingly unreasonable versions of abortion restrictions
discomfit women under the guise
designed to frighten, manipulate,40 and
5
of providing informed consent.
396. Id.
397. See Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, supra note 20.
398. Id.
399. See generally Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions:
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005)
(studying the various reasons women decide to have abortions).
400. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, supra note 20.
401. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
402. Greenhouse, supra note 20.
403. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, supra note 20.
404. Lithwick, supra note 20.
405. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, supra note 20. For example, states could
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It remains a mystery to this author and to countless other bystanders, including Justice Ginsburg, where exactly Justice Kennedy came up
with these sweeping conclusions about the nature and moral nuances of
motherhood.4" 6 Perhaps this moral meandering through the realm of
motherhood was merely intended to distract the reader from one of the
most disturbing elements of the Carhartdecision discussed immediately
after: The lack of a health exception, and the fact that this striking
absence did not render the PBABA unconstitutional.

5.

STENBERG WHO?: NO NEED FOR A HEALTH EXCEPTION

Casually addressing the absence of a health exception, despite the
fact that no abortion regulation had been passed without such an exception since Roe v. Wade in 1973, Justice Kennedy states that "[t]he prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under precedents we here
assume to be controlling, if it 'subject[ed] [women] to significant health
risks."' 4 °7 In spite of "evidence that intact D & E may be the safest
method of abortion" presented by the respondents,40 8 as well as testimony by abortion providers concerning the various health benefits of
intact D&E4 °9 and testimony that "intact D & E was safer for women
with certain medical conditions or women with fetuses that had certain
anomalies,"4 ' the Court concludes that precedent "instruct[s] that the
pass a wide range of new laws under the rubric of "informed consent" that would
require doctors to show women the results of ultrasound imaging of the fetus before
it is aborted, to describe in gruesome detail how the fetus will be terminated,
dismembered and removed, to offer the state's views on the existence of any pain
the fetus might feel when it is destroyed; and, in general, ratchet up the emotional
anxiety of women who are about to undergo abortions.
Id.
406. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1647-48 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe concerns expressed are untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government's
interest in preserving life."); id. at 1648 ("[T]he Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for
which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their
choices .... "); id. at 1648 n.7 (disputing the existence of a so-called "post-abortion syndrome");
Gonzales v. Carhart: An Alarming Nod to "Woman-Protective" Anti-Choice Advocates, Law
Professor Blog Network, http://awprofessors.typepad.com (Apr. 20, 2007) (observing that Justice
Kennedy "suddenly waxes nostalgic about motherhood"); Lithwick, supra note 20 ("With a
stirring haiku[,] ... the justice interpolates himself between every one of those mothers and every
child she might have bear."); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, supra note 20 (calling this
discussion "purple prose about the natural bonds of love between mothers and children" and
calling "it Kennedy's 'mother and child reunion' speech").
407. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635 (second and third alterations in original).
408. Id.
409. Id. These benefits include the fact that "intact D & E decreases the risk of cervical
laceration or uterine perforation because it requires fewer passes into the uterus with surgical
instruments and does not require the removal of bony fragments of the dismembered fetus,
fragments that may be sharp," and "intact D & E ... reduces the risks that fetal parts will remain
in the uterus" and "takes less time to complete." Id.
410. Id.
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' 4 11
Act can survive this facial attack.
The majority opinion acknowledged the existence of medical
uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women, which would make the prohibition
unconstitutional. The majority opinion, however, simply concludes that
"[tihe Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to
pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty."4'12 This approach is in stark contrast to the Court's methodology
in Stenberg, in which the majority stated that "uncertainty mean[t] a
significant likelihood that those who believe that [intact D&E] is a safer
'4 13
abortion method in certain circumstances may turn out to be right,"
and that therefore, "[w]here a significant body of medical opinion
believes a procedure may bring with it greater safety for some patients
and explains the medical reasons supporting that view, we cannot say
'4 14
that the presence of a different view by itself proves the contrary."
Thus, whereas in Stenberg the Court concluded that, "where substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular
abortion procedure could endanger women's health, Casey requires the
statute to include a health exception when the procedure is 'necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother."' 41 5 In spite of the acknowledged lack of medical consensus in Carhart, the Court reached the very different conclusion that
"[t]he medical uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition creates
significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this
facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden. 41 6
Justice Kennedy also diverges from Stenberg in using the existence
of alternate forms of abortion as a reason to conclude that the Act does
not impose an undue burden. Due to the acknowledged medical uncertainty over whether and when intact D&E may be best for the patient,
the Court in Stenberg concluded that "[t]he State fails to demonstrate
that banning [intact D&E] without a health exception may not create
significant health risks for women, because the record shows that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D&E] would be the safest procedure. ' 417 "[A] State
cannot subject women's health to significant risks . .. [by] forc[ing]

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. at 1636.
Id.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 938.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932.
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women to use riskier methods of abortion." 4' t 8 The Court in Stenberg
even went so far as to note that its cases "have repeatedly invalidated
statutes that in the process of regulating the methods of abortion,
imposed significant health risks."4 19 In contrast, Justice Kennedy uses
the existence of alternate methods of abortion to conclude that the
PBABA "does not construct a substantial obstacle to the abortion
right,"4 2 even though medical uncertainty persists over whether those
methods are more dangerous for women.
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy concludes that Stenberg's emphasis on
the inclusion of a health exception has encouraged lower courts "to
leave no margin of error for legislatures to act in the face of medical
uncertainty, 4 21 thus enacting "too exacting a standard" on the legislative power.4 22 Despite acknowledging that "some recitations in the Act
are factually incorrect,"4 23 the Court still curiously gives the benefit of
the doubt to the legislature, even after Stenberg's extensive discussion of
the virtually per se requirement of a health exception in light of medical
uncertainty over the relative safety of medical procedures.
C. Justice Thomas's Concurrence:
Make Them an Offer They Can't Refuse
At first glance, Justice Thomas's short concurrence appears to be
something that might easily be glossed over, seeing as how it is a mere
four sentences long. Not wanting to break with tradition, Justice Thomas
takes the opportunity to reiterate that "the Court's abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe v. Wade, has no basis in the Constitution."4 24 So far, this is nothing exceptional. The truly interesting part of
the concurrence, however, comes in the third and fourth sentences, in
which Justice Thomas notes that "whether the Act constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is not
before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside
the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it."'4 25 Could
it be true? Is Justice Thomas inviting us to wonder what would happen if
418. Id. at 931.
419. Id.
420. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
421. Id. at 1638.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1637-38.
424. Id. at 1639 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Thomas has made a regular
habit of reiterating his argument that Roe and Casey should be overturned. See, e.g., Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 980-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
979, 983 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ.).
425. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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a Commerce Clause challenge were brought against the PBABA, while
at the same time insinuating that such a challenge might have been suc42 6
cessful in striking down the statute?
1.

TAKING THE BAIT: WHAT'S THE WORST THAT COULD HAPPEN?

The possibility of a Commerce Clause challenge being able to
strike down the PBABA has been mentioned as one possible way to
attack the statute.4 27 In light of the extensive damage done to abortion
jurisprudence by the majority's ruling, as discussed above, perhaps it
would behoove those who wish to protect the right to have an abortion
to examine what could possibly happen if a Commerce Clause challenge
had been brought against the PBABA.
Under the framework laid out in Lopez and Morrison, in which the
Court "spoke of the need for Congress to regulate economic activity
which substantially affects interstate commerce," "the constitutionality
of the PBABA is debatable."4'2 8 This is indeed the approach taken by
Professor Brannon Denning, who conducted his own analysis of the
PBABA under the Commerce Clause to conclude that it would not be a
valid exercise of power if one were to focus on the principles of Lopez
and Morrison.4 29 Asking whether the PBABA is more like the statutes
invalidated in Lopez and Morrison or more like the Controlled Substances Act upheld in Raich, Professor Denning, writing his Supreme
Court opinion as Chief Justice Roberts, concludes that because the
PBABA is being challenged on its face, rather than in an as-applied
challenge, as was the case in Raich, that the Act should be analyzed
under the Lopez/Morrison framework.4 3 °
Indeed, the activity regulated by the PBABA-intact D&Eswould have to be analyzed under the third broad class of activity that
Rehnquist concluded that Congress could regulate under the Commerce
Clause in Lopez: "intrastate activities that nevertheless 'substantially
affect' interstate commerce.1 43 1 Therefore, "if the Act is to be upheld, it
must satisfy the Lopez and Morrison factors used to determine whether
intrastate activity nevertheless substantially affected commerce such that
it could be reached by Congress. ' 43 2 Thus, one would need to proceed
426. See Eminent Domain, http://eminentdomain.blogspot.com (Apr. 18, 2007, 16:45 EST).
427. E.g., Reynolds Holding, The Court's Pro-ChoiceSilver Lining, TIME.COM, Apr. 18, 2007,
http://www.time.coff/time/nation/article/0,8599,1612338,00.html.
428. Neal Devins, How Congress Paved the Way for the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Revival: Lessonsfrom the FederalPartialBirth Abortion Ban, 21 ST.JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT.
461, 464 (2007).
429. Denning, supra note 68, at 168.
430. Id. at 171.
431. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
432. Id. at 172.
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by examining the criteria listed in Lopez by which the impact on interstate commerce could be assessed,4 33 and observing that the "economic
regulated activity was 'central to [the
or non-economic nature of the
4 34
Court's] decision' in Lopez."
Under the criterion of whether or not the regulated activity of the
PBABA is economic or non-economic, an argument could be made in
either direction. The "question of whether an abortion procedure itself is
commerce has yet to be entirely settled, '4 35 and the Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue. In this instance, it is helpful to consider
Raich's definition of "economics," which the Court defined as "the pro43 6 It can be
duction, distribution, and consumption of commodities.
argued that the PBABA "regulates only the noneconomic part of the
437 and
transaction, namely, the performance of the medical procedure,"
that the PBABA is "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms,' ' 8 thus making it an unconstitutional
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.
Most likely, under Lopez and Morrison, the PBABA would be an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. If the
Court is able to strike down statutes that regulate guns in school zones
and gender-motivated violence coupled with mountains of congressional
evidence detailing the impact of this violence on interstate commerce, it
is likely that it could find that the very small subset of abortion procedures represented by intact D&E procedures do not constitute activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. Additionally, Congress
included no findings with the PBABA detailing its impact on interstate
commerce; indeed "none of the findings address the connection between
partial-birth abortions and the economy or interstate commerce, much
less describing how, even in the aggregate, partial-birth abortions 'sub433. These criteria are
(i) whether the regulated activity was economic or non-economic; (ii) whether there
was ajurisdictional element tying the regulated activity to interstate commerce so as
to permit a case-by-case inquiry when the connection to interstate commerce was
not apparent; (iii) whether the statute was accompanied by congressional findings
describing the connection of the regulated activity to interstate commerce; (iv)
whether the regulation was part of a nationwide regulatory scheme whose efficacy
would be undermined if Congress could not reach the activity; and (v) whether
accepting arguments regarding the connection of interstate activity would mean, as a
practical matter, that the commerce power had no enforceable limit.
Id.
434. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 (2000)).
435. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 328.
436. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
437. Denning, supra note 68, at 176.
438. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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stantially affect' the latter. 4 39
However, with the Supreme Court's movement away from Lopez
and Morrison in Raich in 2005, it has been argued that the Court would
have no problem in upholding a statute like the PBABA:
Since getting an abortion-which generally involves paying someone
for a service, and sometimes involves crossing state lines to do so-is
far more plausibly called economic activity than growing pot in your
backyard, there's no chance that the Court would strike down a federal abortion law on these grounds. 44
Since the Supreme Court has never decided whether abortion procedures
constitute commerce, and abortion procedures involve payments to
providers, as well as the travel of women over state lines to obtain abortion services, it could also be argued that these services might constitute
"the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities" as
Raich defined an "economic" activity.
2.

ON SECOND THOUGHT, MAYBE WE'D BETTER NOT: WHY IT WAS A
BETTER DECISION TO AVOID A COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHALLENGE IN GONZALES

V. CARHART

Ultimately, it was probably a very wise decision for the legal counsels involved in the litigation in Gonzales v. Carhartnot to challenge the
PBABA on Commerce Clause grounds. While it could be debated
whether the PBABA could be upheld in light of the Supreme Court's
decisions and apparent inconsistencies in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, it
is also quite possible that a Commerce Clause argument might "spell the
end to federal laws like the one barring picketing of abortion clinics."'
Indeed, it has been argued that "pursuing this strategy in court could set
precedent foreclosing important protections for women's reproductive
rights, such as protection for clinics, as well as other important social
legislation enacted by Congress, including environmental and civil
rights legislation, by constricting congressional power to address
national problems."" ' 2 Not bringing up the challenge to the Commerce
Clause was not evidence that, as some scholars suggest, "neither prochoice nor right-to-life interests had any incentive to talk about such
mundane issue as whether abortion regulations are 'economic' and
whether the aggregate impact of partial birth abortions 'substantially
affects interstate commerce,' ,," but rather evidence that perhaps there
439. Denning, supra note 68, at 180 (emphasis omitted).
440. Posting of Scott Lemieux to Lawyers, Guns and Money, http://lefarkins.blogspot.com
(Sept. 13, 2005, 13:22 EST).
441. Holding, supra note 427.
442. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 305 (footnotes omitted).
443. Devins, supra note 428, at 468.
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was too much at stake for both sides if these arguments were indeed
raised.
D.

Justice Ginsburg's Dissent: Rightfully Alarmed

Because so many of the main themes of Justice Ginsburg's impassioned dissent have been covered in the critique of Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion, it will suffice to reiterate her main points and note the
grave warning that she issues for the survival of abortion rights if the
Court continues down its current path.
Justice Ginsburg is, at the least, justifiably disturbed by the Court's
failure to acknowledge the gender-rights implications in its decision in
Carhart. Emphasizing that "at stake in cases challenging abortion
restrictions is a woman's 'control over her [own] destiny,'""44 and that
legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures "center on
a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature, ' '44" Justice Ginsburg concludes that this decito make an autonomous choice, even
sion "deprives women of the right
446
safety.'
their
at the expense of
Justice Ginsburg continues to declare, rightfully, that "[t]oday's
decision is alarming," at least in part because "for the first time since
Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a
woman's health.""'4 7 Because "the Court has consistently required that
laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in all cases,
safeguard a woman's health,"44' 8 and, because, "[i]n Stenberg, [the
Court] expressly held that a statute banning intact D & E was unconsti9
tutional in part because it lacked a health exception,""' Justice Ginsburg
concludes that in this case, too, a health exception should be required.
Because it does not contain a health exception, Justice Ginsburg concludes that the PBABA is unconstitutional. Justice Ginsburg is even
more disturbed by the Court's deference to the legislature's decision that
because "the evidence
a health exception was not needed in the PBABA
've' -learl, demonstrate[d] the nnnpite' '"450 under the standards
employed in Stenberg and Casey.
Lastly, Justice Ginsburg is rightfully disturbed by the Court's confession that "moral concerns" are at work. These "moral concerns," Jus444. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1649.
447. Id. at 1641.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1642.
450. Id. at 1644 (alteration in original).
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tice Ginsburg observes, are "untethered to any ground genuinely serving
the Government's interest in preserving life,"4 5 ' which was the claimed
justification used by the Court to uphold the PBABA: The Act, indeed,
"saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method
of
performing abortion."4'52 Additionally, the dissent is justifiably alarmed
and troubled by the unsubstantiated claims of the majority that women
who have abortions come to regret their decisions, thus justifying
upholding a ban on certain abortion procedures. Indeed, the dissent
reminds us that there is "no reliable evidence" for this "antiabortion
shibboleth"45' 3 invoked by the Court and that the entire discussion ultimately "reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and
under the Constitution-ideas that have long since been discredited."45' 4
For these reasons, the dissent concludes, rightfully, that the majority
opinion "refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously,"4 5' 5 and that
"[t]he Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not
concealed."4'5 6
IV.

THE FUTURE OF ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE: LEARNING To COPE

In light of all the dire predictions of various abortion-rights scholars
and the pro-choice legal community, as well as the alarming sense of
impending doom communicated by Justice Ginsburg, this author fully
expected some dramatic fall-out of the collapse of abortion rights in the
wake of Gonzales v. Carhart.Indeed, while "critics sounded the alarm
that women would be harmed, physicians would be jailed, and state legislators would be energized to pass similar laws,"4'57 it appears that these
fears may have been a bit preemptive: "Six months later ... [there were]
no prosecutions on the federal or state level, little legislative action, and
quiet adjustments in abortion procedures that have so far kept doctors on
the safe side of the law. 45 8
Where is the backlash anticipated by the scholars studying the
impact of Gonzales v. Carhart?Have there simply been no new cases
challenging state statutes that are analogous to the PBABA? The latter
question is answered more readily than the former, because there have
been multiple challenges to state statutes analogous to the PBABA since
451. Id. at 1647.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1648.
454. Id. at 1649.

455. Id. at 1641.
456. Id. at 1650.
457. Tony Mauro, Abortion Ban Back at 4th Circuit, LAW.COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 193389426200.
458. Id.
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the April 2007 of Gonzales v. Carhart.Given the unprecedented reading
of the PBABA by the Supreme Court in concluding that the statute was
constitutional, it might be expected that the analogous state statutes
would be upheld as well in challenges subsequent to the Carhart decision. This, however, has not proven to be the case. For example, the
United States District Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit read Carhart "narrowly in striking down a Michigan ban,"45' 9 ultimately holding
that "Michigan's law fails to comply with the explicit limitations that the
460
Supreme Court has established for statutes regulating abortion"
because "its restrictions went beyond those included in the federal
ban. ' 4 6 1 Likewise, it was predicted in October 2007 that when the
Fourth Circuit reconsidered Virginia's 'partial-birth' abortion ban, perhaps the strictest ban in the country, that it would see the law as "substantially broader and vaguer than the federal statute, and, therefore,
unconstitutional, ' 4 62 even after Carhart.And, indeed, Judge M. Blane
Michael informed the Virginia Solicitor General that simply relying on
Carhart would not "quite get [him] home," implying that the panel
might have been "more receptive to abortion rights attorneys' arguments
that the Supreme Court's decision was a narrow one and did not authorize more far-reaching state restrictions. '"463 Lastly, the Wisconsin Attorney General wrote in June of 2007, after the Carhartdecision, that the
state's ban on partial-birth abortion "likely cannot be enforced because
the federal law that
the law is based on a stricken Nebraska law and not
4 64
was recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court."
Thus, it appears that the federal courts are proceeding with caution
when it comes to applying the principles set forth in Gonzales v. Carhart. Perhaps because of the stark and sometimes startling differences
between Carhart and the Supreme Court's previous abortion jurisprudence, lower federal courts are hesitant to implement any major changes
to their own abortion jurisprudence until further proof of the direction
the Supreme Court will be taking in the future emerges. While this
should provide some degree of relief tO abortion-rights supporters,
because it is perhaps suggestive that Carhart may not have the catastrophic results that were predicted, the fact remains that Gonzales v.
459. Posting of David S. Cohen to Feminist Law Professors, http://feministlawprofs.law.sc.edu
(Oct. 29, 2007, 10:02 EST).
460. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2007).
461. Robert Barnes, Judges Appear Hesitant on Virginia 'PartialBirth' Abortion Ban, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2007, at A10.
462. Mauro, supra note 457.
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Carhartstill represents a "stunning sacrifice of women's health and physician judgment" 65: One that is "alarming," as noted by Justice Ginsburg, and one that "abandons core principles of Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey."4 '6 6 Lest one become too enthusiastic or
reassured by the reactions of the lower federal courts, one must be mindful that "abortion opponents won big"46' 7 in Gonzales v. Carhart.Additionally, the Court's willingness to diverge from its abortion precedent
could be argued to be a "signal that it's willing to reconsider other
precedents in this area and perhaps even Roe."4'68 Ultimately, one thing
is clear: Fulfilling Justice O'Connor's observation in Stenberg that
"[t]he issue of abortion is one of the most contentious and controversial
in contemporary American society,"46' 9 "Carhart will inflame political
controversy rather than diminish it."47 °

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, supra note 15.
Id.
Holding, supra note 427.
Harris, supra note 18.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 432.

